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“Banking is essential to a modern economy. Banks are not.”
—Edward Furash (1993)
OMMERCIAL BANKS ENJOYED record
profits in 1992 and during the first half of 1993.
Many observers believe the industry’s future
may be far less bright, however, if banks con-
tinue to lose market share to other intermediaries
and providers of transaction services. Some poli-
cy makers, including Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan and Comptrollerof the
Currency Eugene A. Ludwig, have questioned
whether banks will be able to maintain their
role as providers of financial services in the fu-
ture without significant changes in regulation.’
A shrinking banking industry may reflect a
reallocation of resources toward more efficient
uses, and, hence, should not necessarily be
viewed as undesirable. But, because banks are
heavily regulated, policy makers needto consider
whether their policies are either hastening or
interfering with changes in the size and structure
of the industry. Such changes may impose sig-
nificant social costs, since commercial banks are
at the heart of the payments system and continue
to be important sources of credit for small firms
and other borrowers. Furthermore, changes in
the size or importance of the banking industry
might also affect the ability of the Federal
Reserve to implement monetary policy, since
monetary policy is conducted primarily by alter-
ing commercial bank reserve balances.2
The banking industry has been on a roller
coaster ride since 1980. From World War II
through the 1970s, banks generally had stable
earnings and no more than 10 bank failures oc-
curred in any year. The banks that did fail
were usually tiny and largely unnoticed. The
number of failures rose sharply in the 1980s,
reaching 206 in 1989. Although the number of
failures has since declined and bank profits have
1
Greenspan (1993); Ludwig’s remarks beforethe Merrill
Lynch Financial Services Conference are reported in
Bureau of National Affairs (1993).
2Duca (1993) investigates the impact of a diminishing role
for banks on monetary aggregates and the implications for
Federal Reserve control of the money supply.4
recently been high, the size and structure of the
industry have continued to change dramatically.
The upheaval of the past 10 years and uncer-
tain outlook for the industry’s future make this
an appropriate time to put recent changes in the
size of the banking industry in a longer-term
perspective. This article first examines the ap-
parently diminishing role of commercial banks
as intermediaries and providers of transaction
services. Commercial bank shares of U.S. finan-
cial assets, commercial lending and transaction
accounts have fallen in recent years, which
some observers believe reflects an industry in
long-term decline. Others, however, argue that
banks will remain central to the payments sys-
tem and important lenders for large classes of
borrowers, and note that banks are generating
an increasing amount of their income from off-
balance-sheet” activities. This article presents
some evidence on both sides of the debate and
addresses two major policy changes that many
observers believe are needed for banks to remain
prominent providers of financial services in the
future: 1) removal of limits on branch banking
and 2) relaxation of restrictions on the services
that banks may offer.
IS THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS DECLINING?
Commercial banks specialize in the evaluation
of credit risks and monitoring of borrowers, as
well as clearing transactions. Traditionally, they
have been important sources of loans for firms,
households and even governments. In addition,
banks are integral to the payments system, issu-
ing most of the nation’s transaction deposits and
clearing domestic and international payments.
As of December 31, 1992, the 11,461 U.S. com-
mercial banks and trust companies whose
deposits are insured by the FDIC held $3,506
billion of assets, $2,699 billion of deposits and
employed 1,477,827 people.3
Although commercial banks remain the largest
single class of financial institutions in terms of
assets, banks have lost market share to other
intermediaries and providers of transaction
services.~Dramatic improvements in communi-
cations and computer technology have teduced
the cost of performing information-intensive ac-
tivities, and thereby permitted growing roles for
firms and markets that provide specialized
financial services. They have also subjected
American banks to increased competition from
foreign lenders, as have reductions in govern-
ment barriers to the flow of goods and capital
between countries.~
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the declining market
share of banks as intermediaries. Figure 1 shows
that commercial banks’ share of financial assets
held by all financial institutions has fallen since
the early 1970s. Indeed, the trend has been
downward since World War H. Commercial
bank loans as a share of the short-term debt of
nonfinancial corporations has similarly declined,
as figure 2 illustrates.’
One rapidly growing source of funds for large
corporations is the commercial paper market,
which has expanded rapidly since the 1960s.
Many corporations, especially established firms
with good credit histories, have discovered that
they can acquire short-term funds less expen-
sively by issuing commercial paper than by bor-
rowing from banks. Figure 3 shows that the ratio
of commercial paper outstanding issued by non-
financial corporations to the commercial and in-
dustrial (C&J) loans of banks has risen markedly
since 1980.~
While facing new competition for borrowers
from the commercial paper market and from
nonbank lenders, banks have also faced greater
competition for funds. In the 1960s, the expand-
‘Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1992).
~Atthe end of 1992, U.S. commercial banks had total finan-
cial assets of $2,774.6 billion, while thrift institutions had
$13452 billion, life insurance companies had $1,622B
billion, other insurance companies had $624.4 billion,
private pension funds had $2,349.4 billion, state and local
government employee retirement funds had $972.3 billion,
finance companies had $607.1 billion, mutual funds had
$1,050.2 billion and money market mutual funds had $543.6
billion. The source of these data is the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System’s Flow of Funds.
5See Edwards (1993, pp. 9-11), Barth, Brumbaugh and Litan
(1992, pp. 59—64) and Kaufman (1991) for further discussion
of the sources of increased competition for commercial
banks. Aguilar (1990) documents the growth during the
1980s of bank services provided by nonbank firms.
~Atthe end of 1992, nonbank private financial institutions
had total financial assets of $10,012.0 billion. Commercial
bank loans to nonfinancial corporations totaled $516.5
billion, while the sum of loans and other short-term paper
of nonfinancial corporations was $866.0 billion. The source
of these data is Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve
System, Flow of Funds.
7At the end of 1992, C&l loans totaled $597.6 billion and
outstanding commercial paper of nonfinancial corporations
was $107.1 billion (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Flow ofFunds). Hahn (1993) provides a
description of the commercial paper market.Figure 1
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Figure 3
Ratio of Commercial Paper of Nonfinancial
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ing money market offered corporations and
wealthy individuals new alternatives to bank
deposits. Inflation and rising interest rates caused
extensive deposit outflows from banks because
the rates that banks were permitted to pay de-
positors were limited by interest rate ceilings.
Banks responded by introducing negotiable cer-
tificates of deposit, which were not subject to
rate ceilings. Many banks also adopted the one-
bank holding company organizational form to
acquire funds from the money market by issu-
ing debt instruments through the holding com-
pany. Still, commercial banks were unable to
maintain their share of the market for financial
assets.
The money market mutual fund was perhaps
the most important financial innovation affect-
ing the ability of banks to compete for deposits.
Introduced in the 1970s, money market mutual
funds offer small depositors the opportunity to
hold highly liquid accounts yielding market in-
terest rates. Although uninsured and with mini-
mum transaction amounts, money market
mutual funds grew rapidly in the 1970s and
early 1980s as reserve requirements and in~
terest rate ceilings left banks competitively dis-
advantaged. Commercial banks also lost their
monopoly on the issuance of insured transaction
accounts when thrifts and credit unions began
offering share accounts, often on more favora-
ble terms than banks were permitted to pro-
vide. Deregulation of deposit interest rates in
the 1980s enabled commercial banks to compete
for funds, but did not reverse the declines in
bank market shares for transaction accounts.
Access to the payments system remains almost
exclusively the domain of commercial banks;
mutual funds, thrifts and other financial institu-
tions issuing transaction accounts must ultimately
rely on banks to make payments. Nonetheless,
increased competition for transaction account
customers helps explain why the banking indus-
try’s share of aggregate financial assets has fallen.
Increased competition for traditional bank ser-
vices affecting both the asset and the liability
sides of bank balance sheets has caused numer-
ous observers to be pessimistic about the future
of the banking industry. Edwards (1993) goes so
far as to argue that “if our financial markets and
institutions were being created for the first time
in 1990, banks might not be among the surviving
institutions.” Others, such as Barth, Brumbaugh
and Litan (1992), Gorton and Rosen (1992) and
Kaufman (1991) contend that government poli-
cies that restrict the geographic location and
services that banks can provide and impose
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regulations (such as minimum capital and reserve
requirements and community investment man-
dates) that are not placed on other intermediaries
hamper the ability of banks to compete. These
researchers argue that the banking industry is
destined to decline substantially in the future
without significant regulatory changes.
Other researchers are more sanguine about
the banking industry’s future. Boyd and Gertler
(1993), for example, argue that much of the in-
creased risk-taking by banks and their subse-
quent poor performance during the 1980s can
be attributed to the failure-resolution policy
known as “too-big-to-fail.” To reduce the possi-
bility that the failure of a very large bank could
lead to a systemic crisis, with depositor runs on
many banks, regulators adopted a policy that
tended to protect all of the depositors and often
other creditors of large banks that failed. In
contrast, uninsured depositors of small banks
that failed were less frequently protected from
loss, and the assets of such institutions were
more often liquidated.
Although the “too-big-to-fail” policy was im-
plemented to limit the repercussions stemming
from the failure of very large banks, Boyd and
Gertler (1993) contend that the policy encouraged
large banks to assume greater risks than they
would have otherwise. The consequence was
that banks with more than $10 billion in assets
had the lowest average profit rate during
1983—91 of any size class, regardless of location.
Boyd and Gertler thus applaud recent increases
in hank capital requirements and restrictions on
the use of the “too-big-to.fail” closure policy im-
posed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),
because both changes should limit the incentive
for large banks to take excessive risks.~
Boyd and Gertler point out that many banks
are now generating substantial earnings from
non-traditional, or off-balance-sheet, sources.
The unique position of banks in the payments
system and their access to the federal lender of
last resort enhances the role of banks in provid-
ing services to nonbank lenders and financial
8WaIl (1993) describes howthe “too-big-to-fail” policy and the
likelihood of systemic risk will likely change under FDICIA.
9Remolona and Wultekuhler (1992) report that finance com-
pany lending shares increased the most in niches, such as
lease financing, where finance companies have traditional-
ly played a major role, which also suggests that the large
gains made by finance companies during the 1960s may
not signal a long-run trend.
markets, Ironically, banks have played a signifi-
cant role in the development of new financial
markets and services that compete in traditional
bank niches. For example, bank loan guarantees
to issuers of commercial paper have spurred
the growth of the commercial paper market. Be-
cause many such lines of credit are provided to
back finance company issues of commercial
paper, the decline of bank loans relative to com-
mercial paper issues overstates the decline of
the commercial banking industry’s role in inter-
mediation.”
Other off-balance-sheet activities that provide
income for banks include loan sales, loan servic-
ing, mutual fund sales and participation in the
markets for derivative securities, such as op-
tions and swaps.’°Many banks originate and
then sell loans to third parties before they come
due. Often home mortgages or other common
loan types are bundled and sold in secondary
markets, a practice known as securitization. The
fee income that banks generate from issuing let-
ters of credit, providing loan commitments,
securitization and dealing in foreign exchange
and derivative securities has increased more
rapidly in the last decade than interest income,
as figure 4 illustrates.
The unique position of banks in the payments
system and their access to the Federal Reserve
discount window also suggest that banks could
remain important lenders in the future. By mon-
itoring transaction accounts, or by requiring
that borrower receipts and payments be pro-
cessed by the bank, for example, banks can ac-
quire useful information about current and
potential borrowers. Even though specialty
lenders and financial service firms, such as
mutual funds, provide some intermediation serv-
ices at lower cost, banks may continue to have
an advantage for loans that are especially
information~intensive}1
SHOULD BANKS BE GIVEN
GREATER POWERS?
Despite the advantages of access to the pay-
ments system and Federal Reserve discount win-
‘°SeeNapoli (1992) for a discussion ofderivative securities
markets.
‘1Using data from 1978—92, Pulley and Humphrey (1993) esti-
mate that the economies from supplying loan and transac-
tion services jointly are small.8
Figure 4
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dow, and the substantial growth of income from
off-balance-sheet activities, many observers, in-
cluding lloyd and Gertler, advocate significant
changes in bank regulation. Most state restric-
tions on branching have already been removed
and regulators allow banks to sell mutual funds
and offer other securities services, Interstate
branching remains largely prohibited, however,
as do commercial bank underwriting and
ownership of most corporate securities.12 In ad-
dition, banks are largely prohibited from offering
a variety of related financial services, including
insurance and real estate services.” Advocates
for further reduction of restrictions on branch-
ing and the services that banks are permitted to
offer argue that deregulation would enable banks
to achieve greater diversification and, hence,
reduce their chance of failure. Proponents also
contend that large, diversified banks would be
more efficient and provide financial services at
‘2Several states have recently enacted or are considering
reciprocal legislation that would permit branch offices of
out-of-state banks based in states with similar laws. The
privilege, however, applies only to state-chartered banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.
‘“Barthand Brumbaugh (1993) provide an up-to-date summary
of commercial bank powers at both the state and national
levels.
lower cost to the public than presently available,
though critics rebuff many of these claims.
A review of all of the arguments in favor of
and against expanded branching authority and
deregulation of bank assets and services is be-
yond the scope of this article. The following
sections, however, will describe the evolution of
branching laws and restrictions on bank serv-
ices in the United States, focusing especially on
historical lessons that could inform the current
debate on these issues.
BRANCH BANKING
Unlike the United States, most countries have a
small number of commercial banks, nationwide
branching and virtually no bank failures. The
high costs of communication and transportation
may have made it difficult to operate vast branch
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the 19thcentury, but today the main impediment
to branching is government regulation.14
Where permitted, banks might operate
branches to capture economies of scale, diver’-
sification opportunities or lower overhead costs.
States that allow branch banking tend to have
fewer banks (but not fewer bank offices) per
capita than states that restrict branching.’” A
bank locates in a particular market only if there
appears to be sufficient demand for it to operate
at a profitable scale. Because the minimum pro-
fitable scale for a branch is smaller than for an
independent bank, in the absence of branching
resti-ictions, small markets that are served by
one or two independent banks might instead be
served by several branch offices.
Proponents of easing branch banking restric-
tions contend that branching affords banks
greater opportunity to diversify and, hence, les-
sens their chance of failure. Banks whose assets
are comprised largely of loans in a particular
region could be pulled down by an adverse local
economic shock, whereas a bank with loans in
several regions could withstand a downturn in
the economy of any one region it serves. Branch-
ing restrictions do not necessarily prevent banks
from diversifying geographically. Banks some-
times purchase loans made by banks in other
locations. In addition, multiple bank holding com-
panies and limited facility branches, such as loan
production offices, are often permitted where
full-service branches are not, including across
state lines.’8 Nonetheless, branching restrictions
limit flexibility and increase the cost of diversifi-
cation, and proponents, such as Kaufman (1993),
argue that interstate branching would “permit
even greater geographic and product diversifica-
tion than interstate holding company banking
and improve bank safety.” Similarly, Clair and
O’Driscoll (1991)argue that branching restrictions
explain why Texas had so many bank failures
during the 1980s while the banking industry as a
whole had record profits. Such arguments were
also made in the 1920s, when thousands of unit
banks failed in rural farming states, even as the
banking industry as a whole was profitable.17
Banking Before World War H
The geographic dispersion ofAmerican banking
markets and restrictions on branch banking have
a long history. In the 19th century, sparsely
populated states often permitted banks to operate
with little capital to ensure the presence of bank-
ing facilities in rural areas. Branch banking net-
works could have met the demand for bank
offices, but fears that branching would reduce
competition and pull savings away from rural
areas tourban centers made branching politically
unfeasible. Calomiris (1992a) argues that agricul-
tural landowners had an incentive to favor unit
banking to ensure that local banks would con-
tinue to lend to them following an adverse local
shock. Branch banking organizations, by contrast,
could close offices or restrict loans to areas ex-
periencing distress. In agricultural states, the in-
terests of farmers thus tended to coincide with
those of community bankers and state regulators
to favor restrictions on branching. Consequently,
reductions in minimum capital requirements
were almost always the policy response to in-
creased demand for banking facilities.”
Figure 5 plots the number of U.S. commercial
banks at the end of each year since 1900, and
the number of branch offices since 1920. The
number of banks increased dramatically after
1900, when the Gold Standard Act halved the
minimum capital requirement from $50,000 to
$25,000 for chartering national banks in towns
smaller than 3,000 persons. Many states respond-
ed by reducing minimum capital requirements
for state-chartered banks to as low as $5,000.
The lowering of this barrier and generally strong
economic growth encouraged the entry of many
new banks. The strict limits on branching im-
posed by the federal government and by most
states meant that new banks, rather than new
branches of existing banks, largely met increases
in the demand for banking services.
“Branch banking networks operated in several Southern
states before theCivil War, and the First and Second Banks
of the United States operated branches in several cities.
Branching was not widespread, however, and in many
states banks did not operate branches even where they
were not prohibited.
‘“Evanoff (1988) found that in 1980 the number of bank of-
fices per square mile was higher in both urban and rural
areas of states permitting branching than in unit banking
states. He found, however, more bank offices in states per-
mitting limited branching than in states permitting state-
wide branching.
‘“See Hanweck (1992) for a discussion of policy issues per-
taining to interstate banking.
“For example, the Comptroller ofthe Currency, John W. Pole,
cited the widespread failures of “one-crop” and “fair-
weather” banks, i.e., small, undiversified farming banks, as
evidence of the need for branch banking. See his
testimony in U.S. House of Representatives (1930).
‘“See also White (1982).10
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The rapid increase in the number of banks
continued through 1920. The increase was espe-
cially large between 1914 and 1920 in agricul-
tural states, where wartime demand for farm
products, dispersed populations and sti-ict prohi-
bitions on branching encouraged a plethora of
small unit banks. The number of banks and ag-
gregate bank assets also grew rapidly in the
eight states that adopted deposit insurance sys-
tems. Because insurance premiums were low
and unrelated to the probability of failure,
deposit insurance encouraged greater investment
in commercial banks than would have otherwise
occurred.
In 1921, the number of commercial banks
reached 30,456, an all-time peak. By then, the
shock that would bring about widespread bank
failures and reduce the number of banks had
already occurred. The wartime increase in com-
modity prices reversed in mid-1920, and the All
Commodities Price Index declined 36.8 percent
between 1920 and 1921.20 A sharp increase in
‘“Oklahoma initiated deposit insurance in 1908 and was fol-
lowed by Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota and Texas in
1909, Mississippi in 1914, and North Dakota and Washing-
ton in 1917. See Calomiris (1992b) and Wheelock (1993) for
evidence that deposit insurance strongly influenced the
growth of bank assets and the number of banks per capita
before 1920,
loan defaults and bank failures in agricultural
states followed. Between 1921 and 1929, 5,712
banks suspended operations, including 976 banks
in the peak failure year of 1926.” As in the
1980s, bank failures in the 1920s were regionally
concentrated. Rural areas, especially in the Mid-
west and the South, suffered high failure rates
while failure rates were low in urban areas, the
Northeast and the West Coast.
While the number of commercial banks de-
clined, the number of branch bank offices rose
during the 1920s, from 1,281 in 1920 to 3,353
in 1929. Before 1920, many state banking laws
were silent on the issue of branch banking,
though administrative or judicial interpretation,
or simply custom, prevented branching. By 1924,
however, many state legislatures had considered
the issue, with Arizona, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode lsland,
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia permit-
ting state-wide branching, and nine others per-
mitting limited branching. Other states either
2cU,S, Department of Commerce (1960), series E13.
“‘Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943).11
prohibited all branching or had no law either
allowing oi’ prohibiting branching. Where
branching was permitted, only state-chartered
banks that were not members of the Federal
Reserve System could establish branches. The
National Bank Consolidation Act of 1918,
however, permitted national banks to keep
branches acquired through consolidation with
state-chartered banks. Later, the McFadden Act
of 1927 permitted national banks to establish
branches within their home-office cities in states
that granted the same privilege to state-chartered
banks.”
Despite increased branching, differences in
btanch banking laws explain little of the variation
in bank failure rates across states during the
1920s. Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1993) find
that a state’s failure rate was determined mainly
by the severity of agricultural distress it suffered,
and that distress had a greater impact on failure
rates in states having deposit insurance systems.
Differences in the extent of branch banking and
other suggested causes of failure account for
comparatively little of the variation in failure
rates across states. The lack of an apparent re-
lationship between branching and performance
in the 1920s probably reflects the limited extent
of branching in the Midwest and the South,
where the worst of the agricultural collapse
was felt. Furthermore, state economies in the
Midwest and the South were not sufficiently
diverse to provide banks with much protection
from a general collapse of commodity prices,
even where statewide branching was permitted.
Interstate branching, however, might have al-
lowed sufficient diversification to limit failures.
Canada, which also experienced sharp income
declines in commodity-producing regions, had
nationwide branch banking and just one bank
failure in the 1920s.’”
The Great Depression ushered infurther waves
of bank failures, and though initially concentrated
in farming areas, failures later spread through-
out the country. From 1930 to 1933, 9,096 banks
suspended operations. In 1933 alone, 4,000 banks
closed, including 2,122 that closed during the
Bank Holiday in March 1933 and never re-
opened.’~Between December 1929 and December
1933, the number of commercial banks in the
United States declined 43 percent, from 24,970
to 14,207.
Major banking legislation was enacted during
the Depression, beginning with the Banking Act
of 1933 (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act af-
ter’ its principal authors). This legislation in-
troduced federal deposit insurance, imposed
limits on the interest rates that banks were per-
mitted to pay depositors and constrained bank
activities in numerous ways. Though Senator
Carter Glass believed that banks should be res-
tricted to making short-term commercial loans,
he was an advocate of branch banking. On this
issue he was in the minority, and except for’ a
provision in the Banking Act of 1933 providing
national banks with all branching authority
granted to state-chartered banks, branching was
largely ignored in banking legislation during the
1930s. The large money center’ banks that tend-
ed to favor liberal branching laws and authority
to perform a broad array of securities services,
and which opposed deposit insurance, were
widely viewed as the villains that caused the
Great Depression. Little wonder that New Deal
banking legislation enacted deposit insurance
and curbs on bank securities activities, without
expanding the opportunities for branching.’”
Banking Since World War H
The number of banks changed relatively little
in the 50 years following passage of the Banking
Act of 1933. Since 1984, however, when the
number of commercial banks in the United States
reached a post-World War II peak of 15,126,
the number of banks has fallen 25 percent to
11,406 firms, and today there are fewer com-
mercial banks in the United States than at any
other time in the 20th century.’6
““See White (1983) for further detail about branch banking in
the United States during the 1920s.
23For comparison of the U.S. and Canadian experiences, see
White (1983) or Bordo, Rockhoff and Redish (1993).
“4Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1937, p. 1208.
25Burns (1974) examines the politics involved in New Deal
banking legislation.
26The shaded insert on p. 12 presents an accounting of
changes in the number of banks since 1984, highlighting the
contribution of Texas and discussing other changing aspects
of market structure.12
Recent changes in Bank Market Structure
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Economists usually attribute the stability of
the banking industry from the mid-1930s to
1980 to the system of deposit insurance and
regulation imposed on banks, and the generally
steady growth of the U.S. economy.~’Deposit
insurance and controls on entry to the industry
made bank charters valuable, and deposit in-
terest rate controls stabilized the largest compo-
nent of bank costs. But, over time, rising
inflation and higher interest rates, coupled with
greater competition among banks and from non-
bank intermediaries, increasingly threatened the
stability of the banking system.
Rapid improvements in computer and commu-
nications technology began to seriously erode
traditional bank niches in the 1960s. Nonbank
sources of intermediation, such as the commercial
paper market, grew rapidly in this decade, while
deposit interest rate ceilings hampered the ability
of banks to compete for funds against the ex-
panding money market. The introduction of
money market mutual funds and transaction ac-
counts at thrifts in the 1970s, and ever-
increasing market interest rates, led Congress to
enact the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which dere-
gulated deposit interest rates. Though it helped
banks compete for deposits, the legislation came
at a time when market rates were exceptionally
As competition from nonbank intermediaries
grew, the commercial banking industry itself be-
came increasingly competitive. In the 1960s,
regulators began issuing new bank charters
more freely, and many states reduced barriers
to branching and interstate holding companies.
As their charter values declined, banks had an
incentive to increase their assets-per-dollar-of-
equity and to make increasingly risky loans.28
Increased competition benefited consumers of
banking services, but left the banking system
more vulnerable to exogenous economic shocks.
Declining agricultural income and a collapse
of agricultural and energy prices in the early
1980s resulted in the insolvency of many banks
during the subsequent decade. Many farmers
who had borrowed to buy land in the 1970s
were unable to repay their loans when incomes
fell, resulting in the failure of many agricultural
lenders. Similarly, the economic boom in Texas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma and other energy producing
states that accompanied rising energy prices in
the 1970s gave way to falling incomes in the
1980s. Banks lent heavily to energy producers
and later to real estate developers in these states,
and profited from the fortunes of their borrow-
27Friedman and Schwantz (1963) attribute much of the decline
in failures and absence of banking panics after 1933 to
deposit insurance. More recently, scholars such as Keeley
(1990) and Flood (1993) note theimportanceof regulations
that encouraged banks to act conservatively and offset the
incentive for excessive risk-taking created by deposit in-
surance.
28When deposit insurance premiums are unrelated to risk,
banks have an incentive to take greater risks than they
otherwise would. A decline in charter value magnifies this
incentive. See Keeley (1990).
high. So, banks experienced sharp increases in
the cost of funds and many suffered substantial
losses.14
ers. When incomes realized from real estate de-
velopment failed to meet expectations, borrow-
ers defaulted on their loans and many banks
became insolvent. A similar phenomenon oc-
curred in New England in 1990—92, when a col-
lapse of local real estate markets led to the
failure of numerous commercial banks.
While the number of commercial banks re-
mained fairly constant until the 1980s, the num-
ber of branch bank offices has increased
dramatically over the entire post-World War II
era. The initial surge in branches accompanied
the great population migration from central cities
to suburbs following the war. And, since 1970,
the number of branch offices has more than
doubled, from 21,424 to 53,744 in 1992, while
the percentage of banks with multiple offices
has increased from 29 to 57 percent. Since 1984,
the total number of bank offices (banks plus
branches) has increased, despite a 25 percent
decline in the number of banks, because the
number of branch offices has risen from 41,740
to 53,744.
In the 1920s, branch banking was too limited to
prevent widespread bank failures in areas suf-
fering sharp income declines. The high number
of failures in agricultural and energy-producing
states since 1980 suggests that, despite the large
increase in the number of branch banks in recent
years, branching may still be too limited to pro-
tect the banking system from regional or sectoral
shocks. As in the 1920s, many of the states ex-
periencing the greatest economic distress in the
1980s also had the most restrictive branching
laws. Even states that permit statewide branch-
ing, such as Arizona and Connecticut, have had
relatively high failure rates since 1980, suggest-
ing again that statewide branching alone may
not result in enough diversification to prevent
high numbers of hank failures.
Figures 6—8 provide a rough indication of the
impact of state branching lan’s during the 1980s.
Figure 6 shows states classified according to
whether they permitted statewide branching,
permitted limited branching or prohibited all
branching, as of December 31, 1979.29 Figure 7
shows that states tended to have more banks
per 1,000 inhabitants if they limited branching,
or prohibited it altogether, than if they permit-
ted statewide branching. No such clear correla-
tion between branching restrictions and bank
failure rates is apparent, however. Figure 8
plots the average annual bank failure rate dur-
ing 1980—92 for each state. Among the 48 con-
tinental states, Texas had the highest average
failure rate, a relatively high number of banks
per capita in 1980, and in 1980 prohibited all
branching. Other states with high failure rates,
however, such as Arizona, Oregon, Utah, New
Hampshire, Connecticut and Massachusetts, per-
mitted at least some branching in 1980 and had
low numbers of banks per capita. Moreover, the
average failure rates in some unit banking states,
such as Montana, North Dakota and Illinois,
were low.’°
The lack of an obvious relationship between
state branching laws and bank failure rates is
not surprising for two reasons. First, failures
will not be high unless borrowers are unable to
repay their loans. In ‘Fexas, for example, real es-
tate developers and energy producers suffered
sharp income declines and defaulted on loans.
There were fewer loan losses and consequently
lower bank failure rates in other states, includ-
ing most unit banking states. Second, statewide
branching will not prevent failures if the timing
and extent of economic distress is similar through-
out a state. Texas banks were able to achieve a
measure of geographic diversification through
multi-bank holding companies, and undoubtedly
statewide branching would have enabled even
more diversification. The collapse of energy and
real estate prices affected the entire state,
however, and, thus, many banks would likely
have failed even if statewide branching had
been permitted. New England banks suffered a
similar fate in 1990—92 when the diversification
permitted by statewide branching and regional
interstate holding companies again was insuffi-
cient to prevent numerous failures following
collapse of the region’s real estate market.fl
Banks have avenues for geographic diversifica-
tion even where bn’anching is prohibited, and
may not take advantage of greater diversification
291he source of this information is the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors (1980). South Dakota is listed in this
source as having unlimited statewide branching. After July
1, 1969, however, branch banks could be established only
through merger.
301he coefficient of correlation between the number of banks
per capita a state had on December 31, 1979, and its
average annual bank failure rate during 1980—92 is —0.17.
“Randall (1993) investigates the causes of recent New
England bank failures.15
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opportunities if they are available, but most ob-
servers accept the argument that the freedom
to branch makes diversification easier. Further
liberalization of branching laws might lead to
further declines in the number of banks and to
larger average bank size, however, and today
the debate about branch banking centers largely
on the issues of service, competition and the ef-
ficiency of large banks.
Larger average bank size might reduceindustry
costs because of economies of scale, i.e., that
average unit cost declines as total firm output
rises. A widely cited study by Boyd and Graham
(1991) suggests, however, that large banks may
not be more efficient than small banks. They
find that between 1976 and 1987, banks with
assets in the range of $25—$100 million had a
higher average rate of return on assets than
either smaller or larger banks. Between 1988
and 1990, those in the $100-million-to-$1-billion
class had the highest average rate of return.
Moderate-size banks also had the highest aver-
age returns on equity. Not only have larger
banks been less profitable, but Boyd and Graham
also find that they tend to have lower equi-
ty/asset ratios, implying that large banks are
generally less well protected against insolvency.
Because their evidence comes from a period
when interstate branch banking was almost en-
tirely prohibited, however, the usefulness of
their evidence for indicating whether or not in-
terstate branching networks would be efficient
may be limited.32 Their apparent success in the
South before the Civil War, and the prevalence
of large branching organizations in other coun-
tries, suggest that such organizations can be
profitable.”
‘2Furthermore, large banks may be less profitable because
they tend to operate in more competitive markets than
small banks. Like Boyd and Graham (1991), however,
most studies, such asthose surveyed byHumphrey (1990),
find that scale economies are exhausted for banks of rela-
tively modest size and that the largest banks in the United
States are less efficient than smaller banks. These studies
tend to focus on theentire banking firm, though, and Toevs
(1992) finds evidence of substantial scale economies for in-
dividual banking functions.
“Moreover, Calomiris and Schweikart (1988) find that inter-
state branching organizations in the South withstood finan-
cial distress better than unit banks in Northern states.
Similarly, Canada, whose banking system is comprised of
a few large banks with nationwide branches, did not ex-
perience the extent of financial disruption present in the
United States during the Great Depression. See Haubrich
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Increased branchingwithin states explains some
of the recent decline in the number of banks in
the United States. Interstate branching would
likely cause further consolidation. If branching
leads to greater diversification of bank assets,
or if large branching networks are able to deliver
banking services more efficiently than is pre-
sently possible, then expanded branching powers
might strengthen the industry and help it cope
with increased competition. Moreover, because
the fixed costs of operating a branch office are
low, consumers would likely benefit from in-
creased competition if banks were given greater
authority to branch.’4 The experience with
branch banking in the United States is perhaps
still too limited to sho~vclearly how much the
size and structure of the American banking sys-
tem would change if interstate branching be-
comes a reality. The rapid growth of branch
banks in recent years, however, indicates that
banks have responded to the easing of branch-
ing restrictions and that further easing would
likely lead to further extensions of branching
networks.
FINANCIAL SERVICES
The consequences of permitting commercial
banks to sell insurance, underwrite corporate
securities or offer a variety of other financial
services are perhaps even less certain than the
implications of interstate branching. The Bank-
ing Act of 1933 forced the separation of com-
mercial and investment banking, and though
financial innovation and regulatory interpreta-
tion has, over time expanded the securities ac-
tivities of banks, strict limits on many
securities-related services remain.” For example,
banks are largely prohibited from underwriting,
distributing and owning securities issued by pri-
vate corporations. Researchers have conjectured
how authority to offer a variety of financial
services might alter banking markets in the
United States by simulating mergers of commer-
cial banks and other financial service firms, and
by studying banks engaged in such activities in
other countries.’8 This section reviews a third
research area which examines the performance
of U.S. commercial banks with securities opera-
tions prior to the Banking Act of 1933.
In the United States, commercial banks became
involved in the securities business on a large
scale during World War I, when many banks
invested in and sold war bonds. The success of
war bond drives and the growing interest of
the public in securities ownership led many
banks to offer an increasing variety of invest-
ment services. Commercial banks also ex-
perienced a decline in commercial loan demand
much like that of recent years, as more and
more firms found that issuing securities in the
money and capital markets was less expensive
than borrowing from banks.” Furthermore, the
promise of high returns drew many bank depo-
sitors to securities markets, and, thus, banks ex-
perienced increased competition for funds that
is again very reminiscent of recent experience.
in the 1920s, banks responded to increased com-
petition by offering a variety of securities serv-
ices, such as underwriting, distribution and
brokerage services. Following waves of bank
failures in the early 1930s, Congress imposed
strict limits on the securities activities of banks,
however, because commercial bank involvement
with securities was widely thought to have been
an important cause of the banking crisis.
Senator Carter Glass and other proponents of
the Banking Act of 1933 viewed bank ownership
of securities and bank lending to investors on
security collateral as harmful to banks, deposi-
tors and the economy. Security underwriting
and ownership had increased bank risk, they
charged, and made it more likely that a collapse
of security prices, such as the stock market
crash in October 1929, would cause widespread
bank failures. Glass (1933) argued that by making
loans on security collateral, underwriting new
issues and trading in securities, banks had fueled
security speculation, drawn funds away from
“legitimate” uses and contributed to instability
of both securities markets and the banking
system:
‘4Calem (1993) argues that interstate branching would in-
crease competition and improve access to banking services
for consumers.
‘5Kaufman and Mote (1990) describe the expansion of bank
securities activities since 1933 and argue that liberal inter-
pretation by regulators and the courtshave permitted banks
to offer a variety ofsecurities services. Benston (1990) also
details the securities activities that banks are permitted to
perform under federal law.
‘6See Boyd and Graham (1988) and Benston (1990).
‘7See Currie (1931).
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There seems to be no doubt that a large factor
in the overdevelopment of security loans—and
in the dangerous use of the resources of bank
depositors for the making of speculative profits,
with the risk of hazardous losses—has been the
perversion of national and state banking laws.
The greatest danger is seen in the growth of
‘bank affiliates’ which devote themselves in
many cases to perilous underwriting operations,
stock speculation, and maintaining a market for
the hank’s own stock...
Supporters of the Banking Act of 1933 also al-
leged widespread abuses of fiduciary responsi-
bility by banks that underwrote and distributed
securities. Such allegations included misrepresen-
tations to unsophisticated customers about the
risk of securities, the sale of low-grade securities
to bank trust accounts, the disposal of non-
performing loans via securitization and manipu-
lation of a bank’s own stock.
Today, the most vigorous opponents of ex-
panded powers for banks are securities dealers,
insurance agents and others with a financial in-
terest in limiting competition, though econo-
mists have not reached a consensus on the
appropriate activities of banks, particularly their
use of government-insured deposits.” This sec-
tion reviews recent research on commercial
bank securities activities before 1933. This
research generally finds little support for the
arguments used to justify the separation of com-
mercial and investment banking in the 1930s,
which is significant because many of these argu-
ments are still used to justify their continued
separation.
Early studies of bank involvement in the secu-
rities business generally accepted the view that
such activities increased bank risk and were
subject to abuse.” This view remained largely
unchallenged for many years and was the basis
of regulatory and court decisions further defining
bank securities-related activities. Recent re-
examinations ofbank securities operations in the
period before 1933, however, have found little
evidence of increased risk to the banking system
or abuse.
White (1986) investigates whether security op-
erations increased the probability of commercial
bank failure during the Great Depression. In
these years, most bank securities operations were
conducted by in-house bond departments or
separate security affiliates. Affiliates were
separately incorporated entities but typically
had the same shareholders as the parent bank.
During the Great Depression, the failure rate of
the 145 national banks operating bond depart-
ments in 1929 was 7.6 percent, and the failure
rate of the 62 national banks operating securi-
ties affiliates was 6.5 percent. By contrast, 26.3
percent of all national banks failed between
1930 and 1933, and, hence, national banks with
securities operations had a substantially lower
failure rate than other national banks. White
suggests that economies of scale and greater op-
portunities for diversification might explain the
difference in failure rates since banks with
securities operations were typically larger than
other banks.~°
Proponents of separating commercial and in-
vestment banking frequently claimed that varia-
bility in the earnings of securities affiliates
caused excessive fluctuations in the earnings of
their parent banks. Nevertheless, White found
no significant correlation between the rates of
return of securities affiliates and those of their
parent banks. His evidence casts doubt on the
validity of the argument that securities activities
increase the risk of bank failure.
Benston (1990) addresses a second justification
for the separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking—that the commingling of invest-
ment and commercial banking activities produces
significant conflicts of interest. The original pro-
ponents of separating commercial and investment
banking charged that commercial banks had
taken advantage of small, unsophisticated inves-
tors who trusted banks to give them prudent
advice about securities. Today, similar arguments
are made in favor of limiting bank involvement
with securities and mutual funds. Proponents of
maintaining the status quo note a possible conflict
between an investment bank’s desire to promote
securities it underwrites and a commercial bank’s
“Some economists favor so-called narrow” banking pro-
posals bywhich banks are restricted in their useof insured
deposits to a limited number of very safe assets. See Spong
(1993) for a discussion of narrowbanking. Other economists
prefer the opposite extreme of universal banking, by which
banks are permitted to hold a variety of assets and offer
securities, insurance, real estate and other financial serv-
ices. See Benston (1990) for arguments in favor ofuniversal
banking.
“The most comprehensive of such studies is Peach (1941).
40White also estimates a probit regression model in which
he finds that, after controlling for various financial measures
reflecting management, banks with securities affiliates had
a significantly lower chance of failurethan other banks, while
banks with an active bond department had neithera greater
nor lesser chance of failure.
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duty to provide disinterested investment advice.
Other arguments suggest the temptations a com-
mercial bank might have to underwrite securities
so a borrower can repay unprofitable loans, or
to place unsold securities in the bank’s trust ac-
counts. Benston, however, contends that when
commercial banks were allowed to deal in secu-
rities, conflicts of interest did not lead to
widespread abuses. Moreover, he argues that
many of the conflicts cited by critics of com-
mercial banks were or could be eliminated
through regulation. For example, when commer-
cial banks were permitted to sellsecurities, their
securities affiliates were prohibited from selling
to the trust accounts of the parent bank.
Benston points out that potential conflicts of
interest exist with nearly all financial transac-
tions, and the separation of commercial and in-
vestment banking does not guarantee disinter-
ested advice from either commercial or invest-
ment banks. For example, a commercial bank
might attempt to persuade a customer to bor-
row from the bank rather than issue securities
through an underwriter, or steer customers
seeking investment advice to a particular securi-
ties dealer if the dealer maintains a large deposit
with the bank. Similarly, securities firms might
attempt to persuade investors to buy securities
they underwrite rather than those underwritten
by another firm, or induce small savers to buy
securities instead of bank certificates of deposit.
Benston contends that conflicts of interest are
likely to be less prevalent for commercial banks
with securities operations than for specialized
securities firms. For example, a potential hot’-
rower might get better advice from a bank than
a securities firm about whether to take a loan
or issue securities if the bank could offer both.
Similarly, there would seem to be less potential
for biased advice to an investor from a bank
that could provide a variety of investments, from
insured deposit accounts to mutual funds to in-
dividual securities.
Kroszner and Rajan (1993) examine one element
of the conflict-of-interest argument. They com-
pare the performance of securities underwritten
by commercial banks with those underwritten
by investment banks during the 1920s as a
measure of whether commercial banks were
able to fool the public into buying low-quality
securities. Among a matched sample of bonds
underwritten by commercial banks or their
securities affiliates and bonds underwritten by
investment banks, Kroszner and Rajan find that
securities underwritten by commercial banks
had the lower default rate. The default rate of
low-grade securities underwritten by commer-
cial banks was especially low relative to that of
investment banks. Commercial banks also tended
to underwrite higher-quality securities than in-
vestment banks. Kroszner and Rajan suggest
that securities markets may have forced com-
mercial banks to issue more high-grade, safe
securities because of possible conflicts of in-
terest for commercial banks involved in under-
writing. If true, their evidence indicates that the
investing public disciplined commercial banks
with respect to the securities they underwrote.
So, even if potential conflicts of interest be-
tween commercial and investment banking exist,
Kroszner and Rajan conclude that repeal of le-
gal constraints on commercial bank underwrit-
ing would not likely harm the public.
Proponents of allowing banks to offer securities
services point to potential benefits for the econ-
omy. Banks offering securities services might
benefit from economies of scope. Economies of
scope exist if the total cost of providing a variety
of services within a single firm is lower than if
the services are provided by different firms. An
important function of banks is to gather and
evaluate information about potential borrowers
and provide access to the payments system. Com-
inercial banks might be able to underwrite secu-
rities, sell insurance, offer real estate services
and provide other financial services at lower
cost to consumers than currently available be-
cause of economies in the processing and use of
financial information.~’
Calomiris (1993) argues that, historically,
branching restrictions and regulations limiting
the scope of banking activities significantly in-
creased the cost of capital for U.S. firms. Be-
cause of their comparative advantage as
evaluators of information about potential bor-
rowers, commercial banks have tended to be
the principal lenders to new firms. As firms ma-
ture and their creditworthiness becomes widely
known, they tend to borrow relatively less from
4tMester (1987) provides an introductory discussion of econo-
mies of scope in banking. Pulley and Humphrey (1993) find
little evidence of economies of scope in the joint pro-
duction of loans and deposits by U.S. banks during 1978—92,
but do not address the possibility of significant economies in
providing loan and securities services.20
commercial banks and issue more securities
through investment banks. Banks that provide
both loans and underwrite security issues could
economize on the gatheringof information about
firms and accelerate the process by which a firm
moves from relatively high-cost borrowing in the
form of bank loans to lower-cost placement of
debt and equity. If commercial banks were per-
mitted to provide both loans and underwrite
securities, they could provide a firm’s financing
needs over its entire life cycle. Banks could then
spread the cost of acquiring and evaluating in-
formation about a new firm over many years
and reduce the cost of credit for firms in their
early years when investment needs are high
and cash flow is low. Restrictions on branching,
on the other hand, “implied a mismatch between
the scale and scope of firms and those of their
bankers.’~’Such restrictions impeded banks
from achieving the size necessary to finance the
bort-owing needs of large firms. They also
precluded a potentially very efficient means of
financing industrial development—the placement
of corporate securities underwritten by com-
mercial banks through their branch offices.
Moreover, branching restrictions probably in-
creased the cost of transactions because firms
operating in multiple markets were forced to
rely on different banks in each market for pay-
ments services.
The United States remains a long way from
having a system of universal banking, and any
significant change in regulation, such as repeal
of restrictions on the securities activities of com-
mercial banks, requires careful study of numer-
ous issues. Recent research suggests that many
of the arguments for separating commercial and
investment banking, which once seemed com-
pelling, are not supported by historical evidence.
The historical record is silent on some issues,
however, such as the question of what securities
activities commercial banks should be permitted
to fund with insured deposits. Leaving aside
these issues, removal of legal restrictions on
bank securities activities would likely strengthen
the industry by allowing it to compete more ef-
fectively with other~ intermediaries and banks in
other countries. Broadening securities powers
would probably favor larger banks, however,
and might also encourage further consolidation
of the industry.
CONCLUSION
Although the number of commercial banks has
declined sharply since 1984, by other measures,
such as the number of bank offices and total
bank assets relative to gross national product
(GNP), the banking industry has not been shrink-
ing. Some economists contend that the banking
industry has excess capacity. Even more argue
that without significant changes in regulation,
the banking industry is destined to wither. The
relaxation of restrictions on interstate branching
and the securities activities that commercial
banks are permitted to perform are two of the
most frequently proposed regulatory changes
that proponents view as necessary to preserve
the health of the banking industry.
History provides useful evidence about the ef-
ficacy of branch banking and the securities ac-
tivities ofcommercial banks. The United States
experienced a high number of bank failures in
the 1980sbecause its banks were not sufficiently
diversified. As in the 1920s and other decades
when failures were high, a lack of geographic
diversification left many banks vulnerable to
economic downturns. The strongest argument
in favor of interstate branch banking is that it
enhances the ability of banks to diversify across
regions so that they can offset losses in some
regions with profits in others. Questions about
the technical efficiency of large branching net-
works and the effects of interstate branching
on competition and access to banking services
remain controversial.
Perhaps even more controversial is the debate
about the separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking. Securities activities continue to
be widely viewed as too risky for commercial
banks, though, ironically, many commentators
who hold this view also complain that banks are
not making enough loans. Evidence from the
era before legal separation of commercial and
investment banking indicates that commercial
banks with securities operations were better
diversified and less likely to fail than other
banks. Moreover, it appears that commercial
banks underwrote higher-quality securities than
investment banks. Although the historical
record cannot address all issues of relevance to-
day, the evidence generally supports the view
that banks would benefit from an increased var-
iety of financial services.
42Calomiris (1993).21
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